The more combat effective German army was in the end bulldozed by less capable, but more numerous, enemies – or so the argument goes. Army today as we consider wholesale changes to the personnel, logistical, and training systems that grew out of that experience.Ī fashionable argument in the past two decades has been that the Allies won World War II only through the sheer weight of material that they threw at the Wehrmacht in a relatively unskilled manner. More importantly, the work has sparked renewed debate about the combat effectiveness of American ground forces in the European Theater of Operations during the latter stages of World War II – debate that has implications for the U.S. I was gratified when The GI Offensive in Europe was honored as the distinguished book of the year by the Society for Military History and the Army Historical Foundation. The editors, however, felt strongly about including the term “GI” somewhere in the title – and having spent nine years researching and writing, I was not about to argue with them. I had originally entitled the manuscript “Building Blocks of Victory,” which I think more accurately portrays the essence of the thesis that I will discuss.

My presentation this evening is about “The GI Offensive in Europe,” which is the title of my book published in 1999 by the University Press of Kansas.

Fighting Power by Martin van Creveld